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Condemnation Blight and the Abutting Landowner 
A class of landowners who often suffer economic loss from land 
acquisition for government projects1 is made up of "abutting land-
owners" -owners of property sufficiently close to property being 
acquired or under consideration for acquisition by a governmental 
unit so as to be adversely affected thereby. Virtually every public 
project has some impact on surrounding property values;2 the num-
ber of abutting landowners. affected and the degree of harm they 
suffer depends on the size, nature, and configuration of the project 
and surrounding land parcels, and on the speed and public exposure 
of the government planning process. Economic losses of abutting 
landowners may fall into one or more of three types. First, in the 
early planning stages of a government project, the land requirements 
.may be vague or may include land not needed in the final plan.3 
1. The acquisition process generally conforms to the following pattern: First, a 
government agency initiates a planning study to determine the design and cost of the 
public project. A final version of the plan, detailing the land to be acquired, is 
adopted by an appropriate legislative and/or administrative body. Negotiations with. 
landowners who own land in the target area are undertaken, and some owners sell 
voluntarily. Other owners refuse to sell, and the agency is forced to initiate con-
demnation proceedings in accord,ance with applicable statutes. In many jurisdictions, 
a declaration of intent to "take" must be filed with a court of general jurisdiction 
to initiate suit against the landowner for the purpose of transferring title and 
determining compensation. In other jurisdictions, filing by the agency with an appro-
priate court automatically transfers title in the property to the government. The 
agency pays the estimated value of the land to the clerk of the court and takes 
possession of the property. The landowner may either accept the compensation or 
initiate an action against the governmental unit, claiming a larger amount, or 
challenge the constitutionality of the taking. See generally 6 P. NICHOLS, THE LAw 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 24.11-24.2 (rev. 3d ed. J. Sackman 1972). 
2. See, e.g., Foster v. Herley, 491 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1974) (urban renewal project 
reduced value of church property and deprived churches of their congregations); 
Clinton St. Greater Bethlehem Church v. Detroit, 484 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1973) (com-
panion case to Foster); United States v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 182 F.2d 172 (9th 
Cir.),. cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950) (condemnation of sugar cane plantations reduced 
sugar refinery's raw material supply); Town of Kure Beach v. United States, 168 
Ct. CL 597 (1964) (federal condemnation reduced town's tax base); Bacich v. Board of 
Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943) (condemnation of surrounding residences 
and removal of street railway adversely affected rental value of apartment building); 
N.Y. Times, July 8, 1973, § 8, at I, col. 4 (late city ed.); id., July 16, 1972, at 61, 
col. 1 (late city ed.). 
3. See, e.g., Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir., cert. denied, 419 
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Accordingly, a landowner whose land ultimately will not be acquired 
may suffer an immediate loss in land value, reflecting a perceived loss 
in the usefulness of his property.4 Second, as the project progresses 
and property demands are finalized, the target landowners may aban-
don or otherwise fail to maintain their property.'1 The subsequent 
U.S. 837 (1974); Woodland Mkt. Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland, 426 F,2d 955 (6th Cir. 
1970). 
4. This refrain is repeated in a large number of interviews: 
Parcel number 288 was a four-family house that lost all of its tenantry, ac• 
cording to the owner, three years ago when it was announced a highway inter• 
change (Route 75) was going through. The building was vandalized and has 
since been demolished by the city. The property still has not been taken for 
the highway and there is some question about whether the highway will ever 
be built. The problems of the parcel left over after land taking has begun 
can be horrendous. 
Parcel number 145 is a small three-story house with a store on the ground floor 
and t1110 apartments on each of its other floors. The a_partments rent at approx-
imately $50 to $55 per month, only $5 more than m 1965. The owner, who 
formerly operated the fish store on the ground floor, has moved both his 
business and residence to an adjoining, older suburb. The building was owned 
by the same individual for more than twenty years. It is in the path of the 
much anticipated, but now cancelled Route 75. The area around 1t was aptly 
described by the owner as "looking like the Gaza Strip." The apartments arc 
very shoddy and need real repair. The owner, however, when asked about 
making improvements if he was sure of not getting a boost in taxes, pointed 
out that the building is too old-over eighty years-and besides the highway 
was going to be built there. For the moment that does not seem to be occur-
ring; the owner isn't sure of the future of the parcel; and there arc no potential 
alternative buyers. One apartment is vacant; the other seems near to going; 
the store is dosed; and the parcel •is dearly on the road to abandonment-
its future disposal hopelessly caught up in the path of stymied highway 
construction. 
Parcel number 259 is a four-apartment plus two-store frame structure on one 
,. of the old shopping streets of the city. Its windows are broken and the building 
abandoned by tenants, though not boarded up. Vandalized and littered with 
garbage, it has been standing in the same condition for three years. As far 
back as 1965 its owner reported it to have been a very poor buy. He bought 
it in 1963 for $9,000, securing a first mortgage of $5,000 from a savings and 
loan. The parcel is assessed at $13,300. He reported that he is keeping it 
because he can't sell it. It is in a distressed area that nobody wants and he is 
waiting for the city to take the parcel (though it is not in an urban renewal 
area). 
: : : [P]arcel number 107 is a masonry four-story structure with stores on the 
bottom floor and six rental units above it. It is now in the hands of the 
Newark Housing Authority. It was purchased in 1951 for $9,500, with a first 
mortgage retained by the seller for $5,500. Even then this price compared with 
a land assessment of $1,800 and a building assessment of $14,800. The owner 
in the 1964 interview pointed to difficulties in collecting rent and stated that 
though he wanted to sell the parcel he simply couldn't because of the blighted 
area "where people don't want to live; up until three years ago the parcel 
showed 20 to 25 percent return but now there's no return. But I don't want 
to sell because of the possibilities of takeover by the federal or city authorities." 
Even in 1965 he could not get insurance except at a very high rate. By 1971 
the building was empty; the owner's wait for urban renewal had not paid off, 
The parcel had been foreclosed by the city. 
G. STERNLIEB & R. BURCHELL, REsmENTIAL .ABANDONMENT 299-301 (1973). 
5. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), affd,, 
405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968) (deterioration and abandonment of adjacent properties 
that were to be condemned along with subject property led to abandonment of 
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neighborhood deterioration may gradually cause a loss of tenants,6 
divert customers,7 and encourage vandalism and other crimes.8 Third, 
after the government acquires the targeted property, abutting land-
owners may suffer "proximity damages"-damages resulting from an 
incompatible use or nonuse of the nearby government property.9 
This note will discuss the plight of abutting landowners~ and 
explore various legal theories that may provide them with some re-
covery against the government units involved. Because most of the 
theories offer only limited possibilities of recovery, the final section 
of the note will argue for the creation of a more appropriate remedy. 
A landowner aggrieved by governmental acts with respect to 
neighboring property may seek compensation under two basic theo-
ries. First, he may bring a common-law tort action alleging trespass,10 
interference with economic relations,U or nuisance.12 Second, he may 
subject property); In re Bunner, 28 Ohio Misc. 165, 276 N.E.2d 677 (Cuyahoga County 
P. Ct. 1971) (highway project caused deterioration and abandonment of property in 
target area, leading to abandonment of subject property). 
An extensive study of residential abandonment in Newark, New Jersey, found that 
urban renewal projects contributed significantly to abandonment and improper main-
tenance by landowners. G. STERNLIEB &: R. BURCHELL, supra note 4, at 299-301. See 
also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CrrY 167 
(1969). 
6. Cf. Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 
(1974) (uncertainty of lease length led to tenant abandonment); City of Buffalo v. J.W. 
Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269 N.E.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971) (owner of business 
premises unable to find renter). 
7. See, e.g., Foster v. Herley, 491 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1974) (loss of church congrega-
tion); Woodland Mkt. Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1970) 
(loss of food market customers). 
8. See, e.g., Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (vandal-
ism of buildings on property purchased by city and abutting plaintiff's land). See also 
G. STERNLIEB &: R. BURCHELL, supra note 4, at 160: 
Crimes against persons or property in vacant structures can be tied to ease and 
accessibility for criminal beliavior (although the potential economic return on 
property crimes in vacant parcels dwindles significantly once the structure has 
been gutted). Thus, generally it may be said that in the case of serious crimes 
of a premeditated nature, abandoned buildings represent a convenience factor 
for an individual who has already made a decision to commit a crime. For 
crimes of spontaneity which thrive despite lack of economic motivation, the aban-
doned building represents a relatively unobserved shell for criminal activity even 
though the potential gain is also lessened by the victim's fear and thus avoid-
ance of the neighborhood. 
Like crime, fire proliferates in abandoned structures. "Over 10 percent of the city's 
annual fires now occur in abandoned buildings." Id. at 171. 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 252 F. Supp. 319 (!N .D. Mich. 
1966) (highway noise prohibited use of property for school); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 
363 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (city-owned buildings stripped at city's invitation); 
Aguayo v. Village of Chama, 79 N.M.2d 729, 449 P.2d 331 (1969) (odors from sewage 
treatment plant). 
10. See text at notes 29-32 infra. 
11. See text at notes 33-38 infra. 
12. See text at notes 39-65 infra. 
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seek to prove an unconstitutional taking of his property without 
compensation.13 
The first barrier to recovery on a tort theory is the government 
defense of sovereign immunity.14 While there has been a steady ero-
sion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity by both legislative and 
judicial action,15 the doctrine remains viable in some form in federal1° 
and most state courts.17 With respect to claims against the United 
States, although the Federal Tort Claims Act abrogates the sovereign 
immunity defense in negligence actions against the federal govern-
ment, 18 the Act's exception for "discretionary" acts may bar recovery 
by the abutting landmvner seeking compensation for economic dam-
ages resulting from a government land-planning decision.10 Suits for 
damages resulting from the negligent implementation of the decision, 
however-for negligent trespass by government-employed workers 
and for the negligent creation of a nuisance, for example-should be 
allowed under the Tort Claims Act.20 The Tucker Act, which pro-
vides a forum for claims against the federal government "not sound-
ing in tort,"21 has been held to allow suits alleging an unconstitutional 
federal appropriation of property,22 but there is nothing to indicate 
that it would allow recovery on a tort claim joined with a consti-
tutional claim. 
Abutting landowners face similar difficulties with respect to actions 
13. See text at notes 66-122 infra. 
14. See 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 1, §§ 6.21-6.4; w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 131, at 970-87 (4th ed. 1971). 
15. W. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 131, at 971-75, 984-97. 
16. E.g., Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 
(1953); United States v. De Camp, 478 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 
(1973); Peterson v. Richardson, 370 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Tex. 1973). 
17. See, e.g., Graham v. Charleston County School Bd., 262 S.C. 314, 204 S.E.2d 384 
(1974); Campbell v. City of Knoxville, 505 S.W.2d 710 (Tenn. 1974). See also note 23 
infra. 
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (1970). The Act 
does not apply to nonnegligent conduct of government employees, however. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2680(a) (1970). See United States v. 40.60 Acres of Land, 483 F.2d 927, 928 (9th Cir, 
1973) (dictum). 
19. The Act provides that the federal government shall not be liable for acts per• 
formed within the "discretionary function or duty • • • of a federal agency or an 
employee." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). This has generally been held to disallow 
recovery for negligent policy decisions, as opposed to negligent acts. E.g., Dalehite v. 
United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). An abutting landowner will want primarily to 
contest the scope and creation of a government project, which are policy decisions, 
rather than the way in which the project is physically implemented. Cf. Woodland 
Mkt. Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1970). 
20. See, e.g., Seaboard Coastline R.R. v. United States, 473 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973). 
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 507, 1402, 1491, 1496-97, 1501, 
1503, 2071-72, 2411, 2501, 2512 (1970). 
22. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945); United States v. Great Falls 
Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884); United States v. 40.60 Acres of Land, 483 F.2d 927 (9th 
Cir. 1973) (dictum); Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl, 1970). 
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against states. Most states retain, at least in part, the defense of sover-
eign immunity for suits against state agencies.23 Most state courts have 
also extended sovereign immunity to municipal corporations, the 
most frequent defendants in suits by abutting landowners.24 While 
the extension of immunity protects local governments only in their 
"governmental" capacities, and not in their "proprietary" roles,25 an 
abutting landowner's economic damages typically can be linked only 
to a "governmental" planning decision.26 Nuisance and trespass ac-
tions, however, can be maintained if they arise out of the project's 
physical development; in such cases the municipality may be acting 
in its proprietary capacity.27 Moreover, some states have entirely abro-
gated the sovereign immunity doctrine.28 
Even if the abutting landowner .finds a way around the sovereign 
immunity defense, the individual tort theories themselves impose 
qualifications on recovery that make them largely inappropriate to 
remedy fully the abutting landowner's losses. The first tort theory, 
23. See W. PR05.5ER, supra note 14, § 131, at 975-76; Leflar &: Kantrowitz, Tort 
Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1363 (1964). See, e.g., cases cited note 17 
supra. 
Some states have .abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity by statute, but the 
statutes typically are very specific and narrowly construed. See, e.g., Jenkins v. North 
Carolina Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 560, 94 S.E.2d 577 (1956). 
Several state courts have attempted completely to abrogate sovereign immunity, 
but in each case the doctrine was partially reinstated by legislative action. See, e.g., 
Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961), 
modified sub nom. Coming Hosp. Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 488, 370 P.2d 
325, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1962) (modified by CAL. Govr. CoDE §§ 810-956 (West 1966)); 
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) (modified by WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 895.43 (1966)). 
24. E.g., In re Urban Renewal, Elmwood Park Project, 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W ,2d 
895 (1965) (city); Bekos v. Masheter, 15 Ohio St. 2d 15, 238 N.E.2d 548 (1968) (city); 
Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970) (county). 
25. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Village of Franklinville, 265 N.Y. 11, 191 N.E. 716 (1934); 
Campbell v. City of Knoxville, 505 S.W .2d 710 (Tenn. 1974). 
Courts frequently differ, however, on the question of which municipal activities 
are governmental and which are proprietary. Compare Couch v. City of Villa Rica, 
203 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (water and sewer plant proprietary), and City of 
West Point v. Meadows, 236 Miss. 394, 110 S.2d 372 (1959) (garbage dump proprie-
tary), with Elmore v. Aloha Sanitary Serv., 256 Ore. 267, 473 P.2d 130 (1970) (sewage 
system governmental), and Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164 Neb. 196, 82 N.W .2d 274 
(1957) (garbage dump governmental) (dictum). 
26. Those courts that have considered the question have agreed that urban re-
newal activities are governmental. Gibson 8c Perin Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 480 F.2d 
936 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973); Sayre v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 
175 (N.D. Ohio 1967); Bristol Tenn. Housing Authority v. Bristol Gas Corp., 219 
Tenn. 194, 407 S.W.2d 681 (1966). 
27. See Michaud v. City of Bangor, 160 Me. 285, 203 A.2d 687 (1964) (city contractor 
destroyed building); Rix v. Town of Alamogordo, 42 N.M. 325, 77 P.2d 765 (1938) 
(flooding from city ditch). 
28. A number of states have dropped the governmental-proprietary distinction and 
hold local governments generally liable for their torts, but many of them still recog-
nize immunity for legislative planning activities. See IA C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CoR-
PORATION LAW §§ 11.26-.27 (1974). 
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a trespass action for the acts of a governmental unit's agents and offi-
cers on an abutting lando·wner's property, offers only a limited damage 
recovery in specialized fact situations. Although trespass can be either 
negligent or intentional,29 it requires an unauthorized intrusion upon 
the plaintiff's premises,30 and recovery is limited to those injuries 
proximately caused by the unlawful entry.31 Most abutting land-
owners suffer economic losses that cannot be linked to a govern-
mental intrusion, 32 and such damages as are caused by an errant entry 
will not normally provide a significant measure of relief. For example, 
it would be difficult to link tenant evacuation caused by the deterio-
ration of a neighborhood to government employees' occasional entries 
on the abutting landowner's property. 
The second tort theory, interference with reasonable economic 
expectancies or existing contracts,83 contemplates interferences that 
are knowledgeable, intentional, and unprivileged.34 The theory may 
prove to be of little help to abutting landowners because govern-
ments are usually protected by a general privilege allowing interfer-
ence with the business relations of a private party when necessary 
to protect public health and safety.35 In light of courts' traditional 
deference to legislative and administrative decisions dealing with 
the health and safety of citizens, 36 a government act of land acquisi-
tion would have to be singularly egregious to allow recovery.87 For 
29. w. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 13, at 64-65; R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 166, 497 (1965). 
J!O. "The trespass may be committed not only by entry upon the land, or by 
casting objects upon it, but also by causing a third person to enter." W. PROSSER, 
supra note 14, § 13, at 73. The doctrine also may allow recovery for the entry of 
invisible gases and microscopic particles. E.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 
Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960). 
31. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE I.Aw OF TORTS § 1.8, at 29 (1956); REsrATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 162 (1965). 
22. See text at notes 3.9 supra. Novel arguments linking losses and intrusions 
could be tried, however. For instance, it could be urged that the government, by 
causing neighborhood disruption with its planning policies, caused vandals to injure 
the plaintiff's property, thereby perpetrating a trespass. 
33. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 31, §§ 6.5-.11; W. PROSSER, supra note 
14, §§ 129-30. 
34. See Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 
(1956); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 31, § 6.6, at 492-93; Carpenter, Interference 
with Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REv. 728, 735-37 (1928). 
Recovery for negligent interference with prospective business relations or contracts 
bas been allowed in specialized situations against private parties, but it is aberra• 
tional. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra, § 6.10, at 509-10. 
35. Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossicr, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941) (dictum); RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 766-67, 774 (1939); Carpenter, supra note 34, at 748-49. 
36. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954). 
37. It probably would be necessary to show that the government's acquisition was 
solely motivated by a desire to interfere with the plaintiff's contracts and expectancies, 
cf. Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970), and was not 
reasonably justifiable as protecting the public welfare. Cf. Deerfield Park Dist. v. 
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example, if a city acquired property for a landfill adjacent to a land-
owner's property solely in order to defeat his intentions to subdivide, 
the landowner might recover for tortious interference.88 
The third tort theory an aggrieved abutting landowner might try 
is nuisance. Many jurisdictions recognize actions against municipal 
corporations for the creation39 or maintenance40 of a nuisance as an 
exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Moreover, of all 
the common-law tort theories, nuisance affords the abutting land-
owner the broadest basis for potential recovery; the cause of action 
may arise through intent, negligence, or absolute liability for ultra-
hazardous activities, and does not require a physical invasion of 
property.41 
Nuisances fall into two distinct subcategories: Private nuisances 
interfere with the interests of particular persons in the use or enjoy-
ment of their land,42 and public nuisances are minor criminal offenses 
based on some interference with the health, safety, morals, comfort, 
convenience, or public peace of the general community.43 A public 
nuisance may also be privately actionable when, in addition to in-
fringing on public rights, it interferes with the enjoyment of land 
of and causes special damage to particular landowners. 44 
An abutting landowner, whether or not he has suffered "special" 
Progress Dev. Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 850 (1961), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 968 
(1962). 
38. Cf. Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (govern-
ment acquired land in order to foil subdivision plans); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 
363 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (city's acts designed deliberately to reduce market 
value of plaintiff's land). 
39. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Totten, 5 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
269 U.S. 562 (1925). The cases are collected in IA C. ANm:Au, supra note 28, § 11.08 
n.l (1974). 
These courts are split on whether a similar exception exists for the licensing of 
a nuisance. Compare Bagni v. City of Bristol, 127 Conn. 38, 14 A.2d 716 (1940), with 
Speir v. City of Brooklyn, 139 N.Y. 6, 34 N.E. 727 (1893). It is frequently held that 
sovereign immunity will bar suits based on a government unit's failure to abate a 
nuisance created by a tbird party. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Allegheny County, 409 Pa. 
300, 186 A.2d 249 (1962). 
The exception to sovereign immunity for municipal corporations for the creation 
or maintenance of a nuisance does not apply to states or their agencies. See, e.g., Page 
v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 377 S.W .2d 348 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1964); Bingham v. 
Board of Educ., 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432 (1950). However, state enabling statutes 
do not authorize municipal corporations to create nuisances. See, e.g., Squaw Island 
Freight Terminal Co. v. City of Buffalo, 273 N.Y. 119, 7 N.E.2d 10 (1937); Greer v. 
City of Lennox, 79 S.D. 28, 107 N.W .2d 337 (196n. 
40. See, e.g., City of Macon v. Roy, 34 Ga. App. 603, 130 S.E. 700 (1925); Ricketts v. 
Allegheny County, 409 Pa. 300, 198 A.2d 249 (1962) (dictum). 
41. W. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 87, at 574. 
42. See text at notes 55-58 infra. 
43. I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 31, § 1.23, at 64-65; W. PROSSER, supra note 
14, § 88. 
44. See text at notes 50-54 infra. 
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damages, might convince a prosecuting attorney to prosecute a gov-
ernmental unit or its officers on a public nuisance theory.46 Conviction 
would result in a criminal penalty, typically the imposition of a fine, 
and might lead the defendant to correct the nuisance.46 Alternatively, 
the prosecutor could bring an equitable action for abatement of the 
nuisance.47 Failure to comply with the court's order of abatement 
w9uld cause the city and its officers to be liable in criminal 
contempt.48 
Perhaps for political reasons, criminal prosecutions of govern-
mental units for public nuisances are rare.49 The abutting landowner 
has a more effective civil remedy if he can prove that he has suffered 
special damages-damages distinct from those sustained by other 
members of the general public-as a result of the public nuisance.rm 
Generally, his damages must differ in kind, not only in degree, from 
those shared by the community.61 Thus, a plaintiff who suffers an 
interference with the physical condition of his land typically is held 
to have suffered special damages,62 and a municipal corporation has 
been held liable for creating a "mixed public and private" nuisance 
when, while building a new prison with prisoner labor, it allowed 
45. See, e.g., City of Ludlow v. Commonwealth, 247 Ky. 166, 56 S.W .2d 958 (1933) 
(city fined for defective sewers constituting public nuisance). The abutting land• 
owner's attorney, however, should be aware of ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL R.ESPONSI• 
BILITY AND CANoNs OF JUDICIAL ETHICS DR 7-105: "A lawyer shall not present, par• 
ticipate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an 
advantage in a civil matter." 
46. See, e.g., City of Ludlow v. Commonwealth, 247 Ky. 166, 56 S.W.2d 958 (1933). 
47. See, e.g., City of Vernon v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 509, 241 P.2d 243, modi• 
fied, 39 Cal. 2d 839, 250 P.2d 241 (1952) (city and officers found guilty of contempt 
for failing to comply with order to abate pollution of ocean by sewage discharge). 
Note, however, that an injunctive remedy may be inappropriate or unavailable 
against the sort of public project development that often damages abutting property. 
In most cases, the damage has occurred before the action is brought, and courts 
would be reluctant to enjoin a partially completed urban renewal or highlvay project 
for the sake of a small property owner. In addition, the landowner's primary interest 
in most cases will be in obtaining damages, not in restoring the property to its 
former condition. But cf. Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availabilty in Challeng-
ing the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1439 (1974), arguing that 
injunctive relief, rather than damages, is the appropriate remedy against abusive 
police power regulations. 
48. See, e.g., City of Vernon v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 509, 241 P.2d 243, modi• 
fied, 39 Cal. 2d 839, 250 P.2d 241 (1952). 
49. For example, 1933 is the last year a digested case can be found holding a 
municipality criminally liable for creating a public nuisance. 
5o: See IA C. ANTIEAU, supra note 28, § 11.08; 18 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MU• 
NICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.49 (1963); w. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 88. 
51. Compare Weinstein v. Lake Pearl Park, Inc., 347 'Mass, 91, 196 N.E.2d 638 
(1964) (allowing nuisance action based on interference with the plaintiff's land), with 
Whitmore v. Brown, 102 Me. 47, 58, 65 A. 516, 520 (1906) (pier construction blocking 
plaintiff's access to bay not actionable). 
52. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Lake Pearl Park, Inc., 347 Mass. 91, 196 N.E.2d 638 (1964), 
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several of the prisoners to escape and cross the plaintiff's property.113 
Similarly, any vandalism damage caused by a government land acqui-
sition project might support a public-nuisance action for special 
damages.54 
If there is substantial interference with the plaintiff's use and 
enjoyment of his land, the nuisance may be actionable as a private 
nuisance.55 For example, a Minnesota municipal corporation was 
held to have created a nuisance when its sewage treatment facility 
polluted a stream crossing the plaintiff's farm.56 In deciding a private-
(or public-) nuisance controversy, a court must balance several factors 
-the gravity of the harm, the social utility of the defendant's con-
duct, the social value of the plaintiff's land use, and both parties' 
· ability to avoid the harm. 57 The abutting landowner will be disadvan-
taged in this balancing by the presumption that the legislature is 
acting in the public interest in undertaking a land development 
project.58 
The major limitation of the nuisance action is that, of the three 
major categories of damages suffered by abutting landowners-land-
value depression because of a loss in future usefulness, the spill-over 
effects of a deteriorating neighborhood, and proximity damages59-
only the third appears to be recoverable in nuisance. The first cate-
gory of damages is purely economic, and nuisance· normally involves 
a physical act on adjacent property adversely affecting the plaintiff's 
property. 60 The second category of damages concerns difficult causa-
tion questions because the aggrieved abutting lando·wner must argue 
that the condemning authority itself, rather than the third party 
who owned the adjacent property, allowed it to deteriorate and thus 
53. District of Columbia v. Totten, 5 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 
562 (1925). Cf. Gates v. City of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 671, 53 N.W.2d 279 (1952) (bus 
unloading zone in front of property); Adams v. City of Toledo, 163 Ore. 185, 96 P.2d 
1078 (1939) (city set fire to adjacent building). 
54. Cf. text at notes 103-05 infra. 
55. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 _(1939). The interference must be substantial and 
unreasonable, and offensive to a person of normal sensibilities. Id. A defendant to a 
private nuisance action may prevail by proving that he is making a reasonable use of 
his property. See, e.g., Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371 
(1914); McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907). 
56. Johnson v. City of Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451, 247 N.W. 572 (1933). 
57. w. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 89, at 596-602; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 826-28 
(1939). 
58. Cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954). 
59. See text at notes 3-9 supra. 
60. See, e.g., Edge v. City of Booneville, 226 Miss. 108, 83 S.2d 801 (1955) (noise 
and odors from a city gas reduction station); Adams v. City of Toledo, 163 Ore. 185, 
96 P.2d 1078 (1939) (setting fire to an adjacent building); Milan v. City of Bethlehem, 
372 Pa. 598, 94 A.2d 774 (1953) (garbage dump on nearby property). 
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adversely affect the plaintiff's property.61 The recovery of proximity 
damages from an incompatible use of adjacent, government-owned 
property, however, has been common.62 Proximity damages may result 
from the final planned use of the condemned property03 or from any 
preliminary condition of the property,64 and recovery has been 
awarded for damages amounting to less than the full value of the 
plaintiff's property.65 
If the aggrieved abutting landowner fails in an action based on 
tort, another recourse is a constitutionally based action in inverse 
condemnation. This action is supported by extensive precedent allow-
ing recovery against public agencies66 and is not subject to the defense 
of sovereign immunity.67 The language of the fifth amendment of the 
United States Constitution-" ... nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation"-and similar language 
in all but one of the state constitutions68 have been interpreted to 
require that compensation be paid by government units that "take" 
privately mvned property.69 Accordingly, a landowner can seek recov-
61. Gf. Fowler v. Board of County Commrs., 230 Md. 504, 187 A.2d 856, cert. 
denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963) (city not liable for nuisance created by subdivision de-
veloper licensed by city); Ricketts v. Allegheny County, 409 Pa. 300, 186 A.2d 249 
(1962) (city not responsible for county department's creation of nuisance). To the 
extent that the government owns buildings and permits them to deteriorate, some 
losses in this second category may be recoverable as proximity damages. See text at 
note 64 infra. 
62. See, e.g., Newton v. City of Grundy Center, 246 Iowa 916, 70 N.W .2d 162 
(1955) (sewer polluted creek crossing plaintiff's land); Glace v. Town of Pilot Moun-
tain, 265 N.C. 181, 143 S.E.2d 78 (1965) (odors from adjacent sewage treatment plant); 
Aguayo v. Village of Chama, 79 N.M. 729, 449 P.2d 331 (1969) (odors from sewage 
treatment plant); Squaw Island Freight Terminal Co. v. City of Buffalo, 273 N.Y. 119, 
7 N.E.2d 10 (1937) (sewer pollution). 
63. See, e.g., Glace v. Town of Pilot Mountain, 265 N.C. 181, 143 S.E.2d 78 (1965). 
64. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Totten, 5 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
269 U.S. 562 (1925) (prisoner escape from building project); City &: County of Denver 
v. Talarico, 99 Colo. 178, 61 P.2d 1 (1936) (flooding due to temporary c.\':cavation in 
dike). 
65. See cases cited note 62 supra. Many jurisdictions do not allow partial recovery 
in inverse condemnation actions. See text at notes 99-100 infra. 
66. See 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 1, §§ 6.21-6.4. 
67. Pumpelly v. Green Bay &: Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 
(1872}, 
68. E.g., MICH. CoNsr. art. 10, § 2; N.Y. CoNsr. art. 1, § 7; OHIO CoNsr. art. 1, § 19; 
PA. CoNsr. art. 1, § 10. 
Only the North Carolina constitution does not contain any prohibition against 
taking without compensation. That state has reached the same result through con• 
struction of the state's due process clause. Raleigh 8: Gaston R.R. v. Davis, 19 N.C. 
431 (1837). 
69. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay &: Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
166 (1872); Lucas v. Carney, 167 Ohio St. 416, 149 N.E.2d 238 (1958). The fourteenth 
amendment due process clause has been held to apply the fifth amendment taking 
clause to the states and to those to whom the states have delegated their power of 
eminent domain. See, e.g., Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 
196 U.S. 239, 252 (1905); Chicago, B. &: Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897). 
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ery against a governmental unit in inverse condemnation if the unit 
refuses voluntarily to acknowledge a de facto taking.70 A successful 
inverse condemnation action will enable the aggrieved landowner to 
recover the lost value of his interest.71 He may also in some circum-
stances recover "consequential damages," an ambiguous type of dam-
age that includes severance damages-damages to a piece of remaining 
land after a part of a tract has been physically appropriated.72 Conse-
quential damages are typically not awarded, however, where the 
damage is to a piece of land neighboring, but not actually part of, 
the tract appropriated or acquired.73 
The law of inverse condemnation incorporates several legal con-
cepts from tort law. The earliest inverse condemnation decisions em-
ployed a physical ouster theory; they required a physical invasion 
amounting to a total appropriation for government use.74 The doc-
trine later was softened to allow recovery for a trespass not amounting 
to an actual ouster,75 and then merely for a substantial diminution 
The overlap of the federal and state constitutions in this area gives most claimants 
proceeding against states or state subdivisions a choice of law and forum. See, e.g., 
Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974) 
(private plaintiff proceeding against state subdivision in federal court, asserting only 
federal constitutional claim). 
70. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay 8e Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
166 (1872); Lucas v. Carney, 167 Ohio St. 416, 149 N.E.2d 238 (1958). 
71. E.g., Portsmouth Harbor Land 8e Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 
(1922); Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565 (Ct. CI. 1965). 
72, Consequential damages typically embrace such indirect and uncompensated 
losses as good will, business profits, removal expenses, and losses resulting from 
obstruction to light, air, view and access. 0£ particular significance is the sharp 
distinction benveen consequential damages to a remainder area, where part of a 
tract is physically appropriated, and consequential damages to a neighboring 
tract no part of which is actually taken. As to the former, the courts, with 
surprising unanimity, require the condemnor to i;>ay severance damages, i.e., the 
depreciation in the fair market value of the remamder area; but as to the latter, 
most courts deny the adjacent owner recovery despite proof that his property 
may have been depreciated to an even greater extent. 
Spies 8: McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent Domain, 48 VA. L 
REv. 437, 441 (1962) (footnotes omitted). 
73. See, e.g., Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commn. v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419 
(1940) (bridge pier on adjacent land blocked access); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 
269 (1897) (dike cut off access to river); United States v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 
182 F.2d 172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950) (plantations supplying cane 
to sugar refinery condemned); Feltz v. Central Neb. Pub. Power 8: Irrigation Dist., 124 
F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1942) (condemnation of shipping town serving farmer); Southern 
Counties Gas Co. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 934 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 
815 (1958) (service area of utility condemned); Richert v. Board of Educ., 177 Kan. 502, 
280 P.2d 596 (1955) (all other lots on residential block condemned for school); 
Friendship Cemetery v. City of Baltimore, 197 Md. 610, 81 A.2d 57 (Md. App.), a/fd., 
260 Md. 430, 90 A.2d 695 (1951) (all land surrounding cemetery condemned for air-
port approach zone); 4A P. NICHOLS, supra note I, §§ 14.1-14.l[l]; note 72 supra. 
74. Stoebuck, Condemnation of Riparian Rights, A Species of Taking Without 
Touching, 30 LA. L R.Ev. 394, 396 (1970). 
75. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945). 
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of use, absent a physical invasion-essential-Iy a nuisance theory.70 
Currently, the test in the federal courts and in many state courts has 
twn branches; it allows recovery for either physical trespass amount-
ing to the taking of an easement77 or for a nonphysical interference 
substantially destroying the land's usefulness.78 Moreover, some of 
the more recent state court decisions seem to adopt what is in essence 
an absolute liability theory-proof of any significant damage proxi-
mately caused by governmental action is sufficient to allow recovery.70 
Even suing in inverse condemnation, however, the abutting land-
ovmer faces several difficult hurdles. First, the "substantial interfer-
ence" branch of the inverse condemnation action has been held to 
require a near total destruction of the property's usefulness.8° Fur-
thermore, while some courts have applied this test to abutting land-
owners, 81 twn lines of cases have required more, virtually foreclosing 
76. Stoebuck, supra note 74, at 400. 
77. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945) (aircraft overflight); Lucas 
v. Carney, 167 Ohio St. 416, 149 N.E.2d 238 (1958) (invasion by water and rocks). Cf. 
Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (firing guns onto property 
held to be temporary taking; compensation also granted for destruction of buildings). 
Some states deny inverse-condemnation recovery for isolated invasions that more 
closely resemble a tort than a "taking," on the theory that sovereign immunity bars 
recovery. See, e.g., Olson v. King County, 71 Wash. 2d 279, 284, 428 P.2d 562, 567 
(1967) (washout covered property with dirt); Moeller v. Multnomah County, 218 Ore, 
413, 345 P.2d 813 (1959) (blasting at quarry covered property with sand). Cf. City of 
Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1968) (no recovery for one-time 
flooding absent showing of negligence or nuisance). Contra, Kline v. City of Columbia, 
249 S.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 597 (1967) (damage from gas explosion equivalent to "taking"), 
78. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); United States 
v. Certain Parcels of Land, 252 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Drakes Day Land 
Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Board of Educ. v. Palmer, 88 N.J. 
Super. 378, 212 A.2d 564 (1965), revd. on other grounds, 46 N.J. 522, 218 A.2d 153 
(1966). 
A number of courts deny inverse condemnation recovery if there is no physical 
invasion and the government's acts would not support a negligence or nuisance 
action against a private individual. See, e.g., City of Louisville v. Munro, 475 S.W.2d 
479 (Ky. App. 1971) (city zoo); Aguayo v. Village of Chama, 79 N.M.2d 729, 449 P,2d 
331 (1969) (sewage treatment plant); Gervasi v. Board of Commrs., 45 Misc. 2d 341, 
256 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (water tower). Cf. City of Houston v. Renault, Inc., 
431 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1968) (flooding not actionable absent negligence or nuisance). 
79. See Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P,2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 
89 (1965); Thomasek v. State, 196 Ore. 120, 248 P.2d 703 (1952): Mandelker, Inverse 
Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L, Ri::v. 
3, 32-39. 
80. See, e.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 
U.S. 955 (1963); Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 16 (D, 
Conn. 1971), affd., 470 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1972); Schubert v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 
170 (S.D. Tex. 1965); Leavell v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 734 {E,D.S.C. 1964); 
Ferguson v. City of Keene, 108 N.H. 409, 238 A.2d 1 (1968); State ex rel. Fejes v. City 
of Akron, 5 Ohio St. 2d 47, 213 N.E.2d 353 (1966). 
81. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 252 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Mich. 
1966) (highway noise prohibited use of property for school); Drakes Bay Land Co. v. 
United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (government land acquisition cut off access 
to plaintiff's property); Board of Educ. v. Palmer, 88 N.J. Super. 378, 212 A,2d 564 
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inverse condemnation recoveries based only on interference with 
land usefulness. 
In Sayre v. City of Cleveland,82 the plaintiff alleged that the city's 
designation of a General Neighborhood Renewal Plan Area83 that 
included his properties, and the city council's passage of a preliminary 
resolution of intent to appropriate some of his properties, had de-
stroyed the income from his rental properties, substantially reduced 
their market value, and caused the bankruptcy of his rental business. 
The city's affidavit indicated that none of the properties involved 
had ever been finally designated for appropriation, nor had any been 
the subject of an eminent domain proceeding.84 The court held that 
summary judgment should be granted in favor of the city: "[W]e 
think the true rule is that there is no de facto taking of properties 
which have decreased in value because of an urban renewal project 
unless there is physical invasion, damage or injury, or a restraint of 
some type, or action by the City to appropriate such properties."85 
In so holding, the Sayre court severely limited the traditional theory 
of substantial interference as evidence of a taking; in effect, the 
court reinstated the old version of the inverse condemnation test that 
limited taking to government trespasses, 86 in so far as abutting land-
owners are concerned. 
The second line of limiting cases is best illustrated by Conroy-
Prugh Gla.ss Co. v. Commonwealth.87 Advance publicity and public 
hearings indicated that a street extension would run through the 
plaintiff's property. The plaintiff alleged that the publicity caused 
his tenants to vacate and destroyed the marketability of his property, 
and thus amounted to a de facto taking.88 The court held that he 
could not recover: 
It is generally recognized that the mere plotting or planning in antici-
pation of a public improvement does not constitute a "taking" or 
compensable injury to the property affected .... Absent physical in-
(1965), revd. on other grounds, 46 N.J. 522, 218 A.2d 153 (1966) (highway noise). Cf. 
Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (city encouraged 
neighborhood deterioration so as to stimulate voluntary sales to it). 
82. 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974). 
83. The General Neighborhood Renewal Plan was a general preliminary plan, 
prepared to satisfy statutory requirements for federal funding. It did not designate 
specific properties to be acquired; this was done in the later and more specific Urban 
Renewal Plan, which included none of the 87 properties involved in the appeal. 493 
F.2d at 67-68. 
84. With one possible exception, which the court felt was not significant, no 
official notice had been given of intent to appropriate any of the properties. 493 F.2d 
at 68. 
85. 493 F.2d at 70. 
86. See text at notes 74-75 supra. 
87. 7 Pa. Comm. 66, 298 A.2d 672 (1972), 
88. 7 Pa. Comm. at 67-68, 298 A.2d at 673. 
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trusion upon or physical damages to property a de facto "taking" 
occurs or compensable injury is sustained only in those cases where 
the governmental body by its affirmative action or course of conduct 
directly interferes ·with one's use and enjoyment of his property and 
the injury complained of is the direct consequence of such action or 
course of conduct.s9 
The court apparently concluded that advance publicity and an-
ticipatory planning were not "affirmative acts" that could justify re-
covery in inverse condemnation under the substantial interference 
test. 90 The test is broader than the one used in Sayre in that it may 
allow for recovery in the absence of direct government appropriation 
proceedings. However, the Pennsylvania court's narrow definition of 
"affirmative act" ·will exclude some cases of substantial value diminu-
tion caused by publicized government planning activity. 
These decisions illustrate the refusal of courts to extend to abut-
ting landmrners the principles used to compensate condemnees for 
"condemnation blight." "Condemnation blight" refers to the depres-
sion in market value of a parcel of real estate that occurs between 
the time it becomes knmrn that the land is being considered for 
acquisition by a governmental unit and the statutory or judicially 
established date of valuation for governmental compensation for the 
actual taking.91 The landmrner, during this often lengthy time pe-
89. 7 Pa. Comm. at 70-71, 298 A.2d at 674. 
90. But cf. Philadelphia Parkway, 250 Pa. 257, 95 A. 429 (1915); In re Crosstown 
Expressway, 3 Pa. Comm. 1, 281 A.2d 909 (1971) (unequivocal expression of intent to 
appropriate property could be "taking" or "injury" under state constitution and 
statutes). Crosstown Expressway was distinguished in Conroy-Prugh on the ground 
that condemnation proceedings in the former case actually had been initiated against 
some neighboring properties. The project was thus active at the time the inverse con-
demnation action was brought. 7 Pa. Comm. at 69-70, 298 A.2d at 674. 
"Preliminary proceedings" stopping short of a completed condemnation have been 
held by several other courts not to effect a taking. See, e.g., Chicago Housing Authority 
v. Lamar, 21 m. 2d 362, 172 N.E.2d 790 (1961); Empire Constr., Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 
512 P.2d 119 (Okla, 1973); Thurow v. City of Dallas, 499 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1973). Cases are collected in Annot., 37 A.LR.3d 127 (1971). 
A number of courts have held that desiguation of a property as within an urban 
renewal area is not a taking, even though its value may be depressed thereby. See, 
e.g., Adams v. Sims, 238 Ark. 696, 385 S.W.2d 13 (1965); Cayon v. City of Chicopee, 
- Mass. -, 277 N.E.2d 116 (1971); Sorbino v. City of New Brunswick, 43 N.J. Super. 
554, 129 A.2d 473 (1957); 76 Crown St. Corp. v. City of New York, 35 App. Div. 2d 
1005, 317 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1970). 
91. See Arnebergh, Recent Developments in the Law of Inverse Condemnation, 
in 1974 PROCEEDINGS OF THE !N5l'ITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 
319, 324; Hagman, Planning (Condemnation) Blight, Participation and Just Com• 
pensation: Anglo-American Comparisons, 4 URBAN LAw. 434 (1972); Kanner, Con• 
demnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW, 765 
(1973); Sackman, Condemnation Blight-A Problem in Compensability and Value, in 
1973 PROCEEDINGS OF THE !N5l'ITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 157, 
Typically, courts and commentators have been concerned with condemnation 
blight as it affects "direct line" property that is slated to be acquired by a govern-
mental unit-rather than with abutting property. See, e.g., Adams, Eminent Domain, 
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riod,92 may suffer considerable losses.93 The losses typically are the 
same as those suffered by abutting landowners: a depression in mar-
ket value occurring immediately after the public project is publicized, 
due to the limited future usefulness of the property, 94 and the more 
gradual loss of income that accompanies the deterioration of the con-
demnees' neighborhood.95 Although some courts continue to deny re-
covery for condemnation blight, 96 several courts have been more lib-
eral, either measuring the value of the property taken as of a date 
Police Power and Urban Renewal: Compensation for Interim Depreciation in Land 
Values, 7 GA. L. R.Ev. 226 (1973); Anderson, Consequence of Anticipated Eminent 
Domain Proceeding-Is Loss of Value a Factor'!, 5 SANTA Cr.ARA LAw. 35 (1964); 
Arnebergh, supra; Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain: Irreverence for 
Unconstitutional Practice, 30 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 319 (1963); Hagman, supra; Kanner, 
supra; Sackman, supra; Comment, Depreciation Damages: A Condemnor's Windfall, 
51 NEB. L. R.Ev. 147 (1971); Note, Eminent Domain-An Expansion of the Definition 
of Taking, 47 N.C. L. R.Ev. 441 (1969); Comment, Condemnation Blight: Uncom-
pensated Losses in Eminent Domain Proceedings-Is Inverse Condemnation the 
Answer?, 3 PAC. L.J. 571 (1972); Comment, Delay, Abandonment of Condemnation 
and Just Compensation, 41 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 862 (1968); Note, Eminent Domain: New 
Statutory Directives Are Necessary To Streamline Urban Renewal Condemnation 
Procedures To Avoid Delay-Induced Property Deterioration and Depreciation, 22 
SYRACUSE L. R.Ev. 1091 (1971); Note, Eminent Domain-The Time of Taking and 
Just Compensation, 40 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. R.Ev. 97 (1971); Comment, Eminent 
Domain-De Facto Taking, 73 W. VA. L. R.Ev. 348 (1971); 40 FORDHAM LR.Ev. 698 
(1972); 3 ST. MARY'S L.J. 339 (1971); 43 TUL. L. R.Ev. 406 (1969). 
If condemnation proceedings are formally initiated and then discontinued, the 
property owner may be able to recover his expenses and other damages from the 
governmental unit. See generally Note, Discontinuance in Condemnation Proceedings: 
A Study of the Conceptual Approach, 21 U. PITT. L R.Ev. 647 (1960); Note, The 
Condemnor's Liability for Damages Arising Through Instituting, Litigating, or 
Abandoning Eminent Domain Proceedings, 1967 UTAH L. R.Ev. 548. Cases are collected 
in Annot., 92 A.L.R..2d 355 (1963). 
92. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 658-59 (E.D. Mich. 1966), 
a/jd., 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968) (ten years); City of Cleveland v. Cardone, 118 Ohio 
App. 525, 526, 190 N.E.2d 52, 53 (1963) (five years); City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement 
Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 248-49, 269 N.E.2d 895, 899, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 351-52 (1971) (six 
years). In some cases the property may never be appropriated. See, e.g., Woodland 
Mkt. Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d 955, 957 (6th Cir. 1970); City of Chicago 
v. Loitz, 11 m. App. 3d 42, 43-44, 295 N.E.2d 478, 479 (1973). 
93. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 660 (E.D. Mich. 1966), 
a/jd., 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968) (owner's buildings abandoned, vandalized, and 
razed by city order); City of Cleveland v. Cardone, 118 Ohio App. 525, 527-28, 190 
N.E.2d 52, 54 (1963) (alleged loss of $39,400 on an apartment building); City of 
Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 249, 269 N.E.2d 895, 900, 321 N.Y.S.2d 
345, 352 (1971) (loss of rental and market value of an industrial building). 
94. See, e.g., City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 249, 269 N.E.2d 
895, 900, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 352 (1971) ("by reason of the threat of condemnation 
property values were drastically reduced"). 
95. See text at notes 5-8 supra. 
96. The most conservative judicial response is that a compensable talcing does not 
occur until the date that all statutory requirements for condemnation have been 
satisfied; the land is valued only as of that date. See, e.g., Chicago Housing Authority 
v. Lamar, 21 Ill. 2d 362, 172 N.E.2d 790 (1961); Land Clearance for Redevelopment 
Authority v. Morrison, 457 S.W .2d 185 (Mo. 1970), noted in Note, 40 U. Mo. KAN. 
CITY L. R.Ev. 97, supra note 91. 
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prior to the price depression caused by the condemnation°7 or holding 
that a de facto taking occurs when the government project unrea-
sonably depresses property value before the official valuation date.08 
In spite of these liberal holdings, which in effect compensate property 
owners whose land eventually is condemned for partial diminutions 
in land value and income, no recovery has been allowed abutting land-
owners for partial losses of land market value00 or income potential1°0 
caused by the condemnation of adjacent land. 
The other branch of the inverse condemnation test-compensat-
ing for physical intrusion or damage by government instrumental-
ities101-may allow recovery for the abutting landowner in certain 
~ircumstances. For example, repeated trespasses by government 
agents or instrumentalities might support recovery of direct and con-
sequential damages on this theory.102 Similarly, there might be recov-
ery if the government land acquisition project causes a marked in-
crease in local vandalism, and vandals enter upon and injure the 
91. See, e.g., Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. 
Rptr. 1 (1972); Housing Authority v. Schroeder, 113 Ga. App. 432, 148 S.E.2d 188 
(1966); City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269 N.E.2d 895, 321 
N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971). Cf. Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kugler, 58 N.J. 374, 277 
A.2d 873 (1971) (statute establishing date of taking provided earlier date for property 
valuation). 
98. In some direct condemnation actions, the landowner has succeeded in showing 
a de facto taldng at a date earlier than the statutory taldng, giving him both an 
earlier date of valuation and compensation for interim expenses and lost income. 
See, e.g., In re Urban Renewal, Elmwood Park Project, 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W .2d 
896 (1965); Bekos v. Masheter, 15 Ohio St. 2d 15, 238 N.E.2d 548 (1968); Luber v. 
Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970). In other cases, the land• 
owner has initiated a separate inverse condemnation action to recover for the de 
facto taldng. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138 {6th Cir. 1968); Drakes 
Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970); In re Crosstown Express• 
way, 3 Pa. Comm. 1, 281 A.2d 909 (1971). 
Some courts have refused to find a de facto taldng absent some direct physical or 
legal restraint on property use. See, e.g., Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974); City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 
241, 269 N.E.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971). 
99. See, e.g., Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commn. v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419 
(1940) (bridge pier on adjacent land blocked access); Transportation Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878) (tunnel construction caused removal of lateral support 
and river access); Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943) 
(restriction of access by bridge project and removal of street railway); Cuneo v. City of 
Chicago, 292 Ill. App. 235, 11 N.E.2d 16 (1937) (condemnation of nearby market); 
Richert v. Board of Educ., 177 Kan. 502, 280 P.2d 596 (1955) (all other lots on resi-
dential block condemned for school). 
100. See, e.g., Foster v. Herley, 491 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1974) (loss of church con• 
gregation); Woodland Mkt. Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 
1970) (loss of food market customers); Town of Kure Beach v. United States, 168 
Ct. CI. 597 (1964) (reduction in town's tax base). 
IOI. See text at note 77 supra. 
102. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Portsmouth Harbor 
Land &: Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922); Eyherabide v. United States, 
345 F.2d 565 (Ct. Cl. 1965). 
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plaintiff's land.103 The injury is somewhat analogous to unauthorized 
entry and damage by flooding water or sliding mud. In cases allowing 
recovery for flooding104 and mud slides, 105 the government had in-
duced the invasion by altering the natural slope of the land or by 
blocking the natural drainage; similarly, the government may cause 
vandalism by removing a property's natural protection-a stable 
neighborhood. 
Most state constitutions when originally adopted followed the 
Federal Constitution, and included only the proscription that "pri-
vate property shall [not] be taken for public use, without just com~ 
pensation," or other similar language.106 However, beginning in the 
last half of the nineteenth century, many states amended their con-
stitutions or adopted new ones, providing compensation for property 
" ... taken or damaged for public use ... ," or including language to 
the same effect.107 State courts have taken both strict108 and liberal 
views100 under both sorts of constitutional language. Courts adopting 
103. Cf. Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); Bekos v. Masheter, 
15 Ohio St. 2d 15, 238 N.E.2d 548 (1968). In both of these cases, claimants' buildings 
were vacated, vandalized, and demolished by city order as public nuisances before 
actually being condemned. 
104. See, e.g., United States v. Kress, 243 U.S. 316 (1916); United States v. Lynah, 
188 U.S. 445 (1902). 
105. See, e.g., Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965); Lucas v. Carney, 167 Ohio St. 416, 149 N.E.2d 238 (1958). 
106. See text at notes 68-69 supra. 
107. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14 ("taken or damaged''); ILL. CoNST. art. I, 
§ 15 ("taken or damaged"); PA. CoNST. art. I, § 10 ("taken or applied"). Twenty-six 
states have adopted this sort of variation of the federal constitutional language. 
Stoebuck, The Property Right of Access Versus the Power of Eminent Domain, 47 
TEXAS L. R.Ev. 733, 734 n.2, 758-59 (1969). 
108. For example, in Illinois, the first state to adopt the new and presumably . 
more liberal language, see City of Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161 (1888) (granting 
recovery under Illinois constitution against city for cutting off street access), the 
decisions have been remarkably adverse to landowners. See, e.g., Chicago Housing 
Authority v. Lamar, 21 Ill. 2d 362, 172 N.E.2d 790 (1961) (denying compensation to 
condemnee for precondemnation blight); City of Chicago v. Loitz, 11 Ill. App. 3d 42, 
295 N.E.2d 478 {1973) (no compensation for business losses due to threatened con-
demnation); Cuneo v. City of Chicago, 292 Ill. App. 235, 11 N.E.2d 16 (1937) (no 
recovery for business losses due to condemnation of nearby land). 
109. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) 
(granting compensation for "taking'' for noise damage to owner of land near airport, 
absent direct overflights). Accord, Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 926-31, 
496 P.2d 480, 487-92, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568, 570-75 (1972) (dictum); City of Jacksonville 
v. Schumann, 167 S.2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports 
Commn., - Minn.-, 216 N.W.2d 651 (1974); Henthorn v. Oklahoma City, 453 P.2d 
1013, 1016 (Okla. 1969) (dictum); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 
540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). In allowing compensation absent direct 
overflight, these state courts were declining to follow the firm line of federal authority 
that grants compensation for airport noise only when there is direct overflight that 
amounts to condemnation of an easement. See, e.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 
580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963); Leavell v. United States, 234 
F. Supp. 734 (E.D.S.C. 1964). 
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strict interpretations of their constitutions apply the federal 
test-a claimant can recover only if there has been a physical 
invasion of his property or if its value has been substantially 
destroyed.11° The more liberal view allows recovery for a pro 
tanto taking upon proof of special damages-damages uniquely 
affecting the property involved-even though there is no phys-
ical invasion and a limited use for the property survives.111 The 
classification of injuries as special or general is not uniform 
among the states, however, and involves two questions: (I) How 
serious must the damage to the property be in order to be "spe-
cial"?112 (2) What "community" is the reference for determining 
whether the damage is unique?118 There are no clear answers to 
these questions: courts in answering them tend more to state conclu-
sions than to develop working theories of classification.114 N everthe-
less, most courts require the damage to the property to be unique and 
unusually direct or severe. Some courts require physical damage,111; 
While some courts in jurisdictions with language in their state constitutions that 
refers only to property "taken" have been generous to landowners suffering proximity 
damages, e.g., City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 S.2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct, App. 
1964), other courts have held the lack of "or damaged" language to require a con-
servative approach: 
Public improvements often cause severe incidential damages for which, under 
this rule, no compensation may be obtained. But it must be remembered, as has 
been pointed out in other cases, that despite the e.'Camples of constitutional 
amendments and statutes enacted in other jurisdictions to provide the compensa-
tion, none have been enacted in this state; and the fact imposes on the courts all 
the more firmly the duty of observing the limits of the constitutional prohibi· 
tion. It is not their part to provide othenvise. 
Mayor&: City Council of Baltimore v. Himmelfarb, 172 Md. 628, 631·32, 192 A. 595, 
597 (1937). See also McKee v. City of Akron, 176 Ohio St. 282, 199 N.E.2d 592 (1964). 
110. See text at notes 77-78 supra. See, e.g., Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 S.2d 
865 (Fla. 1956) (deprivation of access must be total to warrant compensation); State 
ex Tel. Fejes v. City of Akron, 5 Ohio St. 2d 47, 213 N.E,2d 353 (1966) (physical 
damage from adjacent highway construction did not invade or interfere with owner-
ship); McKee v. City of Akron, 176 Ohio St. 282, 199 N.E.2d 592 (1964) (odors from 
sewage treatment plant not a taking). 
111. See, e.g., Thomsen v. State, 284 Minn. 468, 170 N.W.2d 575 (1969) (highway 
right-of-way narrowed adjacent to plaintiff's land; highway noise and lights may be 
items of special damage); City of Abilene v. Bailey, 345 S.W .2d 540 (Tex. Civ. App, 
1961) (odor from sewage plant). 
112. Compare Thomsen v. State, 284 Minn. 468, 170 N.W.2d 575 (1969) (highway 
noise and lights may be items of special damage), with Arkansas State Highway 
Commn. v. McNeill, 238 Ark. 244, 245-46, 381 S.W .2d 425, 426 (1964) (noise from high• 
way equals general damage). 
113. Compare Town of Hempstead v. Village of Rockville Center, 67 Misc. 2d 123, 
323 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (damage to property values by water tower was 
common to community), with McKinney v. City of High Point, 237 N.C, 66, 74 S.E,2d 
440 (1953-) (erection of water tower across street stated cause of action for taking), 
and City of Abilene v. Bailey, 345 S.W .2d 540 (Tex. Civ. App, 1961) (odor from 
sewage plant was "special" even though other properties were similarly affected). 
114. See 4A P. NICHOIS, supra note I, § 14.1, at 14.5. 
115. See, e.g., Richmond County v. Williams, 109 Ga. App. 670, 137 S.E,2d 843 
(1964) (physical damage to home from construction of highway); Euwema Co. v. 
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although many do not.116 Only one state court has interpreted the 
"special damage" requirement to encompass any significant reduc-
tion in the value of the relevant property.117 
In sum, although an inverse condemnation action is not suscep-
tible to a sovereign immunity defense, and is well supported by prece-
dent, under the Federal Constitution and many state constitutions 
the abutting landowner may use it to recover his economic damages 
only if his property's usefulness has been substantially destroyed by 
governmental acts.118 Although physical intrusions may also support 
recovery, 119 such intrusions typically do not cause a major part of an 
abutting landowner's losses.120 Some relaxation of the inverse condem-
nation test is taking place in some state courts,121 but only one court 
has granted recovery merely on the basis of a diminution in market 
value.122 
The alternatives outlined above fall significantly short of provid-
ing recovery for many aggrieved abutting landowners. For example, 
an abutting landovmer who suffers a fifty per cent loss of income 
from his rental property over a period of several years due to uncer-
tainty regarding the land needs of an urban renewal project would 
not be afforded relief under any of the existing theories if his prop-
erty was never actually appropriated. Similarly, he could not recover 
for a fifty per cent loss of market value linked to the neighborhood 
deterioration caused by abandoning condemnees and other abutting 
landowners. Yet, the basic policy of the fifth amendment seems vio-
lated when significant economic burdens are imposed on abutting 
landowners by the blighting effects of public projects. It is not con-
sistent to award compensation to condemnees for partial precondem-
nation losses while denying all recovery to abutting landowners for 
similar partial losses of property income or value. The Supreme Court 
has often stated that "[t]he word 'just' in the Fifth Amendment evokes 
ideas of 'fairness' and 'equity,' "123 but imposing heavy losses on abut-
McKay Engr. & Constr. Co., 316 ill. App. 650, 45 N.E.2d 555 (1942) (physical damage 
resulting from adjacent sewer construction). 
116. See, e.g., Thomsen v. State, 284 Minn. 468, 170 N.W.2d 575 (1969) (highway 
light and noise). 
117. City of Abilene v. Bailey, 345 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (odor from 
sewage plant was "special" even though other properties were similarly affected). 
118. See text at notes 78, 99-100 supra. 
119. See text at note 77 supra. 
120. The major part of the abutting landowners' losses are economic rather than 
physical. E.g., Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
837 (1974) (loss of tenants); Woodland Mk.t. Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d 
955 (6th Cir. 1970) (loss of customers); Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 
F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (loss of property value). 
121. See text at notes 107-17 supra. 
122. City of Abilene v. Bailey, 345 S.W .2d 540 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). 
123. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950). 
Accord, United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 631 (1961). 
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ting landowners so as to benefit the general public inequitably dis-
tributes the cost of the project among the citizenry. The community 
benefits from the planning and creation of public projects; the com-
munity, ~rough its government, should therefore assume the burden 
of payment. 
Two policy arguments frequently are made to support a denial 
of compensation to parties adversely affected by government decisions. 
One points to the problem of economic feasibility and administrative 
convenience. As one court stated: 
"While not unmindful of the consequences that may possibly be 
visited upon property and property values by reason of planning by 
governmental bodies, particularly in those cases where voluntarily 
-or as required by law-publicity is given to a public improvement 
project and public hearings are conducted incident thereto, we do 
not believe that these consequences as a matter of law are within the 
concept of a de facto "taking" .... To hold othenvise in this class 
of cases would expose governmental bodies to liability for damages 
for all adverse consequences to property and property values, no 
matter how remote, associated with the planning of public improve-
ment projects.124 
Administrative convenience should not justify a denial of com-
pensation with respect to those lando-wners whose property suffers a 
severe economic devaluation, even if the property remains useful in 
limited respects. The fear of exposing governmental bodies to claims 
for "remote" damages ignores the fact that an abutting landowner 
must prove his damages, and must prove that a government act caused 
his damages, to justify recovery. 
The second argument for denying compensation is that the devel-
opment of a public project is basically a political decision, to be made 
by a political body.120 Accordingly, the question of who must bear 
the ultimate economic cost of a public project is properly determined 
by the legislative body involved.126 This argument begs the question, 
however, for it ignores the role of the federal and state constitutions 
in curbing legislative excesses. It is true that governmental units 
must have broad discretion to allocate social benefits and burdens, 
but the allocations must be made within the framework of individual 
liberties and constraints against arbitrary state actions that the federal 
and state constitutions provide. Allowing political bodies to deter-
mine absolutely who may and who may not recover in inverse con-
124. Conroy-Prugh Glass Co. v. Commonwealth, 7 Pa. Comm. 66, '70·'11, 298 A,2d 
672, 674 (1972). • 
125. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
126. See, e.g., Woodland Mkt. Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d 955, 958 
(6th Cir. 1970). 
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demnation would seem to violate the spirit and purpose of the fifth 
amendment and similar state constitutional provisions.127 
While the state and federal supreme courts are the final arbiters of 
the construction that must be given to the "taking" clauses of their 
respective constitutions,128 their interpretations establish only mini-
mum standards for compensation to landowners for losses caused by 
governmental activity.129 Since most of the current tests seem to be 
unjustifiably harsh with respect to abutting landowners, a legislative 
solution seems necessary and desirable. Besides providing for addi-
tional compensation for abutting landowners, legislation could estab-
lish administrative procedures for landowner complaints. Several 
jurisdictions, for example, employ administrative agencies to aid in 
determining compensation claims arising out of some direct and in-
verse condemnation actions.130 Such schemes, perhaps requiring an 
initial petition to a special administrative body with the power to 
award compensation, followed by judicial review, would make use of 
personnel who are specialists in land use and value. 
A second advantage of a statutory solution would be that the legis-
lature could define specific guidelines for compensation, based on its 
policy evaluations.131 For instance, the legislature could prescribe full 
compensation for economic injury caused by public projects where 
the permanent loss exceeds a stated percentage of the market value 
127. See Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970) 
(statute intended to broaden recovery for precondemnation loss of income held 
unconstitutional under state constitution as it allowed recovery only for losses for 
year preceding appropriation). 
128. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
166 (1872); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962). 
129. Some states have broadened inverse condemnation rights by statute. See, e.g., 
CAL. Govr. CoDE §§ 7265-7265.3 (West Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ I-502(e), 
1-601 to -606A (Supp. 1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 32.09-.10 (1973). 
130. For instance, in California all direct and inverse condemnation actions in-
volving the state must first proceed through an administrative body, the State Board of 
Control. Appeal lies in the courts. CAL. Govr. CODE § 945.4 (West 1966). See, e.g., 
Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943). 
In some jurisdictions, special administrative bodies have been established by 
statute to handle direct and inverse condemnation actions arising out of specific large 
projects. Appeal to the courts is available. See, e.g., Connor v. Metropolitan Dist. 
Water Supply Commn., 314 Mass. 33, 49 N.E.2d 593 (1943); In re Ford, 36 App. Div. 2d 
352, 320 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1971). 
At the federal level, the federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with 
the Court of Claims to decide inverse condemnation claims in cases "not sounding in 
tort" and for less than $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970). 
Only the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to hear inverse condemnation claims 
exceeding $10,000. Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963); Sayre v. 
United States, 282 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ohio 1967). Requests to Congress for private 
compensatory bills are frequently referred to the Court of Claims for an advisory 
opinion. See, e.g., Town of Kure Beach v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 579 (1964). 
131. See generally Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 165 (1974). 
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of the property, or where income loss exceeds a percentage of average 
income over a base period. A set of rebuttable presumptions, based, 
for example, on distance from and nature of the project, could be 
established to measure a landowner's loss.1ss 
Government liability to abutting landolvners, whether the product 
of statute or case law, might be a step toward the streamlining of 
project planning and execution. Government land acquisition 
projects now are often caught up in bureaucratic snarls and costly 
delay, with resulting harm to abutting landowners.188 Perhaps it is 
not foolish to speculate that at least part of these difficulties are 
attributable to the lack of responsibility of those who cause the prob-
lems to those who suffer thereby. 
132, Cf. Van Alstyne, Just Compensation of Intangible Detriment: Criteria for 
Legislative Modifications in California, 16 UCLA L, REv. 491, 508-23 (1969), 
133. See, e.g., note 4 supra. 
